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This paper challenges “traditional measurement-accuracy realism”, according to 
which there are in nature quantities of which concrete systems have definite 
values.  An accurate measurement outcome is one that is close to the value for 
the quantity measured. For a measurement of the temperature of some water to 
be accurate in this sense requires that there be this temperature.  But there isn’t.  
Not because there are no quantities “out there in nature” but because the term 
‘the temperature of this water’ fails to refer owing to idealization and failure of 
specificity in picking out concrete cases. The problems can be seen as an artifact 
of vagueness, and so doing facilitates applying Eran Tal’s robustness account of 
measurement accuracy to suggest an attractive way of understanding vagueness 
in terms of the function of idealization, a way that sidesteps the problems of 
higher order vagueness and that shows how idealization provides a natural 




1.  Introduction. 
 
 You measure the temperature of a glass of water and say that the 
outcome is accurate – is right – to within a tenth of a degree. What does this 
mean?  Presumably that there is some number that is, say, the temperature of 
the water in degrees Centigrade, and that the measurement outcome is within 
one tenth of a degree of that true value.  The present paper will work to 
undermine this supposition, though at the very end I will present a way of 
understanding such statements that is consistent with all the difficulties that will 
have come before. 
 
                                            
1 As readers will see, this paper draws heavily from Eran Tal’s (2011 and 2012).  
In effect, I am offering my own more detailed interpretation of parts of his work. I 
have also profited greatly from comments on a draft of this paper from Tal, as 
well as from Michela Massimi, Bas van Fraassen, and Ron Giere.  
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 1.1,  Restrictions. I will restrict attention to physical quantities, though 
most of what I say should apply, with suitable modifications, to both the life and 
the social sciences.  I will also restrict attention to quantities, such as mass and 
temperature, that can be represented with a measurement scale of real numbers, 
as opposed, for example, to curvature that requires a tensor.  But what I discuss 
explicitly should apply also to such multivariable quantities.   
 
 1.2  Initial characterization of measurement accuracy.  To fix on our 
target, we need to review some basics.  
 
 First one distinguishes between measurement indications and 
measurement outcomes:  An indication is “what is shown on the meter”.  But 
often such an indication can be corrected on a theoretical basis.  A measurement 
outcome is the final result after such interpretation.  Throughout I will have 
measurement outcomes in mind. 
 
 One can attribute accuracy to any of measurement indications, outcomes, 
the instruments used to produce indications, and the entire measurement system 
comprised by the instrument and the theoretical basis used for interpretation.  
While much of what I will have to say will apply to all of these, we are best off, 
again, taking measurement outcomes as our primary target. 
 
 Accuracy must be distinguished from precision: The standard analogy 
refers to arrows shot at a target.  The outcomes are accurate to the extent that 
they are close to the bulls-eye.  They are precise to the extent to which they 
cluster closely together.  So measurement can be extremely precise without 
being very accurate.2 
 
 I take the default understanding of measurement-accuracy to be what I will 
call “traditional measurement accuracy realism”.  One supposes that there are in 
nature things, such as lumps of lead and glasses of water, kinds of things, such 
as lead and water, and quantities that pertain to things and kinds, such as mass, 
length, temperature, and time (pertaining to duration of processes); and one 
supposes that in concrete cases such quantities have values.  Stated generally: 
 
 Traditional measurement accuracy realism (stated schematically for 
measurement of quantity, Q, with possible values, q in units, u, on an 
object or type of object, O): 
 
 Presupposition: There is in nature the quantity, Q, with value q in 
units, u3, for object or type of object, O.  
                                            
2 I have written about measurement precision in (Teller 2012) 
 
3 Reference to units is a short way to cover the point that what is postulated are 
not values as numbers, in some Platonic sense, but a ratio or other relation 
 3 
 
Then q’, a measurement outcome of Q in units u on O, counts as 
 
 a) Perfectly accurate: q’ = q 
 
 b) Accurate (enough):  the outcome, q’, is close enough to q for 
present purposes 
 
 c) Outcome q’ is more accurate than outcome q’’:  q’ is closer to q 
than is q’’. 
 
 
Accuracy understood in the traditional way is supposed to be an objective, not an 
epistemic matter.  Realists will agree that accuracy can be estimated but not 
exactly known, but insist that there is nonetheless a fact of the matter, just how 
accurate, in the traditional sense, a given measurement outcome is.   
 
2.  Problems with traditional measurement accuracy realism. 
  
 2.1  General statement of the problem.  Traditional measurement 
accuracy realism fails because the terms used in the relevant statement 
instances fail to refer.  We use terms for quantities and their values:  “The 
temperature of the water in this glass”. Traditional measurement accuracy 
realism suppose that there is “in nature” some determinate quantity, temperature, 
or more specifically, the temperature of the water in this glass, that in this 
instance has some determinate value, say  20.258743…ºC.  My claim is that the 
term, ‘the temperature of the water in this glass’, does not have a referent.  My 
reason is not in any way metaphysical.  It is simply that the full facts of language 
use and circumstances of utterance fail to pick out any one thing to be the named 
quantity, temperature, or any one number to be the claimed value of the claimed 
quantity. While we will see a complex of detailed reasons for this failure, at 
bottom they are all consequences of the contingent circumstance that the world 
is far too complex for our language to get attached to completely determinate 
things, in particular, quantities and their value instances. 
 
 I must dwell on the form of my complaint because it is entirely different 
from what one usually hears from those known as anti-realists, and my argument 
will be misunderstood if the reader falls back into thinking that I am attacking 
                                            
between the quantity Q, as it applies to O, and the quantity Q as it applies to 
some reference object (e.g., international prototype kilogram) or condition (e.g., 
the radiation spectrum of cesium) that sets the units. 
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conventional realism in a familiar way.4  I am not claiming that there are no 
quantities with exact values in nature, nor, as some anti-realists would have it, 
that the whole idea of “things in nature” is incoherent. 5  Indeed, I see no 
coherence problem in such statements because we can model what this would 
be like.  
 
 Rather, to repeat for emphasis, the problem is one of reference failure.  
Such determinate quantities as there may be fail to get attached to quantity 
terms, such as ‘time’, ‘mass’, ‘length’, ‘velocity’, ‘temperature’.  With no 
determinate quantities attached to such terms, there are no determinate values 
for “them” to have.  In addition, even if we suppose that the quantity terms do 
refer, we will see that determinate reference for terms purportedly referring to 
their values would fail anyway.  We will also see difficulties with reference for 
terms for units, such as ‘kilogram’, ‘meter’, and ‘second’.   
 
 The problem is also not epistemic in the sense that presupposes that our 
terms for quantities and their values do refer, but that there are problems in 
knowing just what those values are.  Rather the claim is failure of the 
presupposition, that the relevant terms have been successfully attached to 
determinate referents. 
 
 One immediate reaction is to say, well there are no point-valued referents, 
but we can always make do with an interval.  But how is this interval to be 
understood?  What one always has in mind is that the true value lies somewhere 
in the interval.  But that takes us back to the questioned exact valued referents.  
In section 2.6 I will examine questions about intervals in more detail. 
 
 2.2 Reference failure source points. There are different kinds of 
problems for three different kinds of what I will call “reference failure source 
points”. The first is comprised by quantities in the sense of a dimension as used 
in dimensional analysis.  Mass, length, and time are usually taken as 
fundamental, and they figure in the characterization of other quantities, such as 
velocity, that has the dimensions of length divided by time.  I will refer to these 
collectively as “dimensional quantities”.  Dimensional quantities are theoretically 
individuated, that is identified by the role that they play in our theories.6 
 
                                            
4 I do not consider the view I present in this paper to be ant-realist.  Indeed, as I 
will explain in the paper’s last paragraph, the present view is the sensible way 
that realism should have been understood all along.   
5 Nor would I claim that there are such things “in nature”, whatever that might 
mean.  This paper is entirely agnostic about this question.  If the reader MUST 
know what my private view is on this matter, let me just say that it is deeply 
Kantian. 
 
6 As argued by Tal who  concludes that 
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 Our next reference failure source point is the units used in characterizing a 
quantity.  Measurement outcomes have to be expressed in specific units, such as 
kilograms, meters, and seconds. When traditional measurement accuracy 
realists postulate an independently existing value for a quantity of an object on 
an occasion, where objective accuracy is some measure of the difference 
between this and a measurement outcome, the independently existing value 
must be understood in terms of the same units.  So problems in characterizing 
units will be problems also for successful reference.   
 
 Finally, I will need to distinguish between dimensional quantities and what 
I will call “working quantities”.  Velocity is something abstract:  Velocity of what? 
Velocity, or its absolute value speed, of sound in air is relatively speaking 
concrete; and speed of sound in air and speed of water in a pipe are different 
concretizations of the abstract, speed.   
 
 One usually does not distinguish between the abstract dimensional and 
the, relatively speaking, concrete working quantities. In particular, metrologists 
appear to refer indifferently to dimensional and working quantities as 
measurands, for example, VIM 7: 2.3 
 
 Measurand:  quantity intended to be measured. 
 
But the distinction does tacitly occur in both VIM and GUM.  VIM, 0.1: 
 
[E]ven the most refined measurement cannot reduce the interval [that 
can reasonably be attributed to the measurand] to a single value 
because of the finite amount of detail in the definition of a measurand. 
 
                                            
 
In order to individuate quantities across measuring procedures, one 
has to determine whether the outcomes of different procedures can be 
consistently modeled in terms of the same parameter in the 
background theory. If the answer is ‘‘yes’’, then these procedures 
measure the same quantity relative to those models. (2012 p. 84  
Italics in original) 
 
This quotation also makes it clear that Tal is here referring to dimensional 
quantities, as opposed to what I will below call working quantities 
         
7 I will be referring to two documents published by the Joint Committee for 
Guidelines in Metrology (JCGM): the International Vocabulary of Metrology, or 
VIM, and the Evaluation of Measurement Data – Guide to the Expression of 
Uncertainty in Measurement, or GUM.  The references will be by section number. 
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If one has dimensional quantities in mind, this statement puzzles because of 
absence of any concrete mention of refinement of “definitions” of dimensional 
quantities. However we see what is in question in GUM.  GUM echoes VIM with: 
 
D.1.1: The first step in making a measurement is to specify the 
measurand — the quantity to be measured; the measurand cannot be 
specified by a value but only by a description of a quantity. However, in 
principle, a measurand cannot be completely described without an 
infinite amount of information…. 
 
What is in question becomes clear with the following example,  D.1.2: 
 
Commonly, the definition of a measurand specifies certain physical 
states and conditions. EXAMPLE The velocity of sound in dry air of 
composition (mole fraction) N2 = 0.7808, O2 = 0.2095, Ar = 0.00935, 
and CO2 = 0.00035 at the temperature T = 273.15ºK and pressure p = 
101,325 Pa. 
 
What is the infinite amount of information here referenced?  Conceivably an 
indefinitely long list of such potentially relevant characteristics.  But more likely it 
is the interval left open by all such specifications.  It is understood that 
temperature is being specified as T = 273.15ºK  +/- .005ºK, etc. 
 
 In any case, I need the distinction between abstract dimensional and 
(relatively) concrete working quantities because there are vastly different 
problems that arise for the two. 
 
 When working quantities are in question there will be some differences 
between type and completely concrete token cases.  When discussing the speed 
of sound in air or the melting point of lead one has in mind characterization of the 
a property of a kind of substance – air or lead as a type.  But one also needs to 
measure quantities for concrete instances – tokens - such as the speed of sound 
in the air in the Sydney Opera House at some specified time, or the temperature 
of the water in some specified glass at a specified time. 
 
 2.3 Difficulties with working quantities.  As relatively concrete 
realizations of dimensional quantities, whatever problems will arise for 
dimensional quantities will, ipso facto, apply as problems for their concrete 
realizations.  But working quantities present additional difficulties.  Roughly 
speaking, these difficulties arise in either how their dimensional abstractions are 
made concrete or from the fact that they are not made completely concrete.  To 
make these additional difficulties clear, for the discussion of working quantities 
we will take their dimensional abstractions as given and unproblematic. 
 
 When working quantities are in question there will be some differences 
between type and token cases.  When discussing the speed of sound in air or the 
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melting point of lead one has in mind characterization of the a property of a kind 
of substance – air or lead as a type.  But one also needs to measure quantities 
for completely concrete instances – tokens - such as the speed of sound in the 
air in the Sydney Opera House, or the temperature of the water in some specified 
glass, both at specified times.  
 
 Taking token cases first, consider a measurement of the speed of sound 
in the air in the Sydney Opera House at 8:00pm Jan 1, 2013.  There are two 
difficulties.  First, just what will we count as part of the Opera House?  Include the 
vestibule?  Oh, you’ll protest, obvious what was intended was the auditorium of 
the Opera House.  But to no avail. With the door open or shut?  Filled with an 
audience or empty? Any specification of a concrete object will leave it open to 
some extent precisely what object is in question. Having failed to designate a 
determinate concrete object, there can be no determinate value that “it” actually 
has. 
 
 Second, the speed of sound will vary from one part of the Opera House 
(or the auditorium of the Opera House, or the….) to another.  For example, 
speed of sound varies with temperature, and the temperature won’t be absolutely 
constant throughout. There will be edge effects…. 
 
 Turning to type cases for working quantities:  This is the problem from VIM 
and GUM quoted above.  The problem could be understood in two ways.  First, 
“speed of sound in air” is open ended, as is “speed of sound in air at temperature  
T = 273.15ºK”, and likewise“speed of sound in air at temperature  T = 273.15ºK 
and pressure p = 101,325 Pa.  Could this list be continued indefinitely with more 
and more relevant features?  Possibly, but that’s a bit implausible, so let it pass.   
 
 But second, how are the specifications to be understood?  As mentioned 
above, most plausibly with a temperature of +/- .005ºK and pressure +/- .5 Pa;  
and values in the intervals will give rise to different speeds of sound.8  One could, 
on the other hand, take the specific characteristics of temperature and pressure 
to be intended as completely precise.  But no real world sample of air has such 
precise values, if only because the values would vary slightly from place to place.  
So at best one is talking about the speed of sound in air at… in some idealized 
condition, not in the real world.   
 
 2.4  Units. The characterization of units presents a whole new raft of 
problems.  Except for the kilogram, fundamental units are now defined using a 
theoretical definition.  For example, currently 
                                            
8  If, with VIM and GUM, we take “definitions” of quantities to includes such 
detailed specification of properties, air with these differing quantity values count 





The second is the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation 
corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the 
ground state of the cesium 133 atom… This definition refers to a 
cesium atom at rest at a temperature of 0ºK.9 
 
This definition involves a number of idealizations.10 Before getting specific I need 
to separate out the kind of problems that will be in question for us. 
 
 To operate as a standard such an idealized theoretical definition has to be 
realized in some concrete piece of apparatus that will in practice function as the 
standard, and so doing involves deidealization from the theoretical definition.  
One first constructs the needed apparatus so as to minimize as far as possible 
the departure from the idealized definition, and one then further deidealizes using 
theory based adjustment of the indications physically produced by such 
instruments.11 
 
 This need for practical deidealization in physical realization of a standard 
differs from the implication of idealization that we will now consider.  The practical 
case concerns the operation of some concrete device.  In examining traditional 
measurement accuracy realism we are concerned with, rather, whether the 
theoretical definition succeeds in picking out a referent, picking out some real 
world characteristic, quite independently of the question of whether that 
characteristic can in practice be exactly realized.   
 
  The form of the problem is that the idealizations involved in a definition of 
a unit mean that the definition is of a unit in an idealized situation, speaking 
metaphorically, in a non-actual “possible world”.  There is no guarantee that what 
is picked out for one or more such non-actual possible worlds will correspond in 
the way needed to any one determinate referent in the real world.  Examination 
                                            
9 Bureau International des Poids and Measures, 
http://www.bipm.org/en/si/si_brochure/chapter2/2-1/second.html 
 
10 I will use ‘idealization’ very broadly to characterize any representational 
inaccuracy.  This can, but need not be understood as in comparison with some 
absolute standard.  The alternative is to think of inaccuracy of a representation 
as what is so characterized from the point of view of some other representation 
that improves on the first in the sense of preserving all past and improving on the 
descriptive successes of the first representation. (Clearly in this note I am using 
‘accurate’ and ‘inaccurate’ in a much broader sense than in the rest of the paper.) 
 
11 See Tal (2011, pp 1088-1090) 
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of cases shows that this is exactly what is in question.12 
 
 Let’s consider first the one unit that is still “defined” by a physical standard, 
the kilogram characterized in terms of the international prototype kilogram.  
Taking this as a perfectly precise characterization of what mass will count as a 
kilogram involves idealizing away variable factors, such as contaminants from the 
air and scratches induced when the prototype is handed in making replicas, both 
problems that managers struggle to minimize but can never completely eliminate.  
Strictly speaking, sublimation of the material of which the prototype is composed 
has also to be idealized away. Or, if one refrains from such idealization, there is 
no one mass that the prototype picks out over time because the complications 
such as the ones just mentioned mean that the mass of the prototype varies, up 
and down.  Even at one time there is no completely determinate real world mass 
that is picked out – for the same reason that gave rise to one of the complications 
for token cases of working quantities:  Absolutely precisely, just what is, even at 
a fixed time, THE prototype? No one answer to this question will pick out an 
object that will provide the kind of standard that we assume.  A policy either of 
including or of not including the present scratches picks out, at best, a standard 
that will be different as soon as the prototype is handled.  Or to give a 
circumstance that is utterly inconsequential in practice, strictly speaking relative 
motion of exactly zero is an idealization.  Real world uses will involve relative 
motion, and so an indeterminacy in what is in question: rest or relativistic mass, 
and if the latter, which one?  Utterly inconsequential in practice, but the realist 
requires a completely precise value. 
 
 Other standards are defined theoretically.  Consider the theoretical 
definition of the second, just above.  This definition ignores the time energy 
uncertainty relation that results in spectrum bandwidth.  Given the bandwidth, the 
definition does not pick out any unique real world temporal duration.  Or again, 
appeal to a temperature of 0ºK.  Nothing in the real world can be at 0ºK, nor can 
0ºK be approached asymptotically because of the finite limit imposed by quantum 
vacuum fluctuations.  At best the definition characterizes a temporal duration in 
some possible world.  In fact in many possible worlds since there is no unique 
way in which the idealizations can be removed (What will a possible world with 
no quantum effects be like??)  There will be no sense to be made of which of 
such possible worlds is “closest” to the actual world, so appeal to “closest world” 
won’t pick out a unique real world temporal interval.   
 
 We’re not done.  The theories, general relativity and quantum field theory, 
used in the theoretical definition are themselves idealizations - two theories that 
                                            
12 It is a sensible question whether the problems that use of idealizations 
generate here are special to the case of measurement, quantities, units, and 
accuracy; or whether they are really more general.  I urge the reader to put this 
question aside for the moment and focus on the arguments.  In section 5 I will 
address the question of whether these problems are really more general.           
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are not unified, and of which it is at least questionable whether they are mutually 
consistent.  These idealizations provide further reasons why, strictly speaking, 
the definition only gives a temporal interval in some, or really in many, possible 
worlds.   
 
 Definition of the meter also fails to deliver the completely determinate 
length that realists require.  BIPM gives the definition of the meter as 
 
The meter is the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a 
time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second.13 
 
This definition inherits all the problems of the definition of the second.  It involves 
the further idealization of the speed of light in vacuuo, and the idealization of 
general relativity applies anew, now through its ideal treatment of distance.   
  
 2.5 Dimensional quantities. I’ve saved the most vexed case for last, the 
case of dimensional quantities. As I mentioned, dimensional quantities are 
individuated by the theories in which variables for these quantities occur.  But the 
theories in question are all idealized.  So there are no quantities as characterized 
in the real world.  If they occur anywhere, it will be (again, speaking 
metaphorically) in the idealized possible worlds of the characterizing theories.   
  
 Take the example of mass.  Is this supposed to be Newtonian mass?  
Relativistic mass?  The mass of quantum field theory that is a renormalized 
quantity and so dependent on the “impact parameter” involved in its 
measurement?   Quantum field theory is still highly idealized, so there is good 
reason to think that further deidealization will further recharacterize just what 
quantity is in question. 
 
 One wants to protest:  These increasingly accurate characterizations are 
all of one quantity of which our theories are giving an increasingly faithful 
account.  I will discuss the “close to” worry in a general way below.  But the 
example of mass helps to make clear the weakness of the response. The mass 
of quantum field theory is so different from that of Newton that the idea that we 
are just refining an already very clear idea looses all plausibility.  The ONLY 
constraint on further deidealization is that old successes be preserved.  These 
old successes may be preserved by radically new ideas of quantities.  This can 
happen by the operation of a limit.  In the relation between special relativity and 
Newtonian mechanics, one gets the latter from the former by letting c/v go to 
zero.  But that doesn’t make the Lorenztian metric and its geometry just a 
refinement of Euclidean geometry.   
 
                                            
13  BIPM, http://www.bipm.org/en/si/base_units/metre.html 
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 Let’s try time:  Our best theory of time is the general theory of relativity 
(GTR).  But GTR is not quantized and current efforts to quantize GTR play havoc 
with the treatment of time. We don’t know the outcome of this story, but at the 
very least there is the lively possibility that a better theory characterizing time 
may characterize it as differently from GTR as quantum field theory characterizes 
mass as compared to Newtonian or relativistic mass.   
 
 Let’s try another quantity, velocity.  Velocity doesn’t occur as a quantity in 
quantum theories.  When we can ignore quantum corrections one takes speed 
(magnitude of velocity) to be the limit of average speed.  But the limit of averages 
is another idealization, one that breaks down badly even before we get to 
quantum corrections.  And if by speed we mean an average speed, which 
average?  
 
 What about length?  When one takes into account the indeterminateness 
of relative position as characterized in quantum theories, there is no such 
quantity.  Indeed, in quantum theories length, or (relative) position, is 
characterized as an operator not as a real valued quantity, again, a radical 
departure from prior conceptions.  Likewise in quantum theories momentum is a 
radically different kind of quantity from prior classical characterizations, like 
quantum mechanical position also characterized by an operator, not by a real 
number. These few words paper over a great many complications, but should be 
enough to show that there are serious issues for the case of both position and 
momentum. 
 
 2.6.  Repair by appeal to intervals? The realist in us all is screaming: 
True, no objectively occurring precise values are attached to our terms. But, 
objectively, suitable intervals (or other collections of values) can do the needed 
realist work.  Here I consider this option, construed in terms of completely 
determinate collections of values, that is, collections for which, for each number, 
there is a fact of the matter whether it is in the collection or not.  Later I will 
consider “indeterminate collections” (starting with the question of what that could 
even mean). 
 
 How should such an interval be understood? What one wants to say is 
that we are taking about an interval of values that are, in some sense, “close 
enough”.  But close enough to what? For realism, as we have construed it, in a 
given problem situation there must BE a value closeness to which counts as 
“close enough” however that is to be understood. But for all the reasons given 
above, there is nothing in the problem situation that fixes the needed objective 
value. 
 
 For the case of working quantities where is a more careful way to make 
out the interval intuition. Let’s see how this goes for speed of sound in air. To 
review the problem, specifying a quantity as “speed of sound in air” is, as VIM 
and GUM would put it, an incomplete definition.  Liquefied air?  Ionized air.  It is 
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plausible that all such extreme cases can be eliminated with a short list of more 
specific conditions:  Air at temperature T = 273.15º K and pressure p = 101,325 
Pa.  But such characterizations of the quantity are still open ended: in the present 
example temperature +/- .005º K and pressure +/- .5 Pa.  The proposed solution, 
in the spirit of supervaluationism, suggests that we get our interval by considering 
ALL the ways in which the characterization could be made completely precise.  
To put it once more metaphorically, consider the possible worlds each having 
some precise value for the quantities in question (temperature, pressure,), the 
range of possible worlds fixed by the limits in such incomplete specification of the 
quantities and that are otherwise maximally similar to the actual world.  Our 
required interval (or other collection) of values will be the values in one or 
another of such possible worlds.   
 
 Such an interval would be objective.  The statement of realist accuracy 
would have to be restated: Instead of distance from some one value there would 
have to be some relation to the interval of question.  This could be done in a 
variety of ways, the details don’t matter.  
 
 This proposal collapses, in different ways, depending on how velocity is 
understood.  Let’s suppose, which is what one usually has in mind, that it is 
instantaneous velocity that is in question.  Again, this is an idealization: there is 
no such thing in the real world.  The proposal is to consider a range of possible 
worlds that differ from the real world only by having one or another precise value 
of the associated quantities, such as pressure and temperature, that are within 
the bounds of the interval specified in the detailed characterization of the 
condition of the air in which the speed of sound is in question. (For the moment 
we are waving the problems with both pressure and temperature, which, when 
reintroduced, further spoil the effort.)  But with these worlds differing from the real 
world only by variation of the exact parameter values within the given bounds, 
these possible worlds will also have no instantaneous velocities.  If velocity 
means instantaneous velocity, the proposal is empty. 
 
 The alternative is to consider some kind of average velocity in each of the 
relevant possible worlds. But which?  No question but that there are averages – 
distance covered divided by the time of travel – that will work for practical 
purposes. (I’m taking the appeal to “practical purposes” to paper over the 
problems with appeal to the distance and time of travel. This broaches problems 
of vagueness, to be discussed in section 4.)  But the realist needs to be specific.  
“Pick some average that works for our current objectives” doesn’t fit the bill in the 
actual world, let alone in all of the various possible worlds relevant in the 
proposed analysis. In addition there are problems with the averages themselves.  
Wave or group velocity?  Wave velocity is strictly defined only for a wave that 
extends to infinity forward and backward.  And distance traveled in unit time 
brings in all the problems with measures of both distance and time – the 
problems we have already reviewed both for the units in question and for the 
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more fundamental quantities – distance and time. 
 
 The interval intuition fails, if anything, more radically, when it comes to 
units.  At first things look hopeful because we are told, for example, that the 
current practical accuracy for standards for the second is to five parts in 10-15  
But what does this mean?  As we will learn below, it means that concrete 
standard realizations can be built to agree to five parts in 10-15.  It’s not yet clear 
what that shows about some kind of objective interval in nature.  The agreement 
in practice clearly has some kind of controlling objective element in as much as 
nature makes us work very hard to get the agreement. But to what one thing “in 
nature”, whether point valued or precise interval, in terms of which realist-
accuracy might be characterized, does this “objective element” correspond? 
 
 Unlike the case of working quantities, there is no natural candidate for the 
needed interval.  For working quantities one plausibly turned to all the different 
ways in which an incomplete specification of the working quantity might be filled 
in.  But in addressing the idealizations involved in the characterization of a unit 
there is no natural or well-defined range of cases of what will count as a 
deidealization.  The only constraint on deidealization is that past successes be 
preserved, that in the case of units amounts to the successes in getting real 
world realizations to agree at least as well as before any new deidelization.  But 
what would be meant by the “interval of deidealizations” that might sustain the 
level of agreement that we now achieve in practice? 
 
 Dimensional quantities suffer, for this issue, the same problems as do 
units. Since dimensional quantities are abstract, unlike their concretizations in 
working quantities, the whole idea of an interval of refinements has no direct 
application. As in the case for units, any idea of an interval would have to be in 
terms of some range of deidealizations from the idealizations involved in the 
characterization of the dimensional quantity in question. It is obscure in the 
extreme what kind of an interval could correspond to departures of our current 
idealization from one or another possible “finally correct” definition of a quantity. 
There would have to be some kind of objective distance measure between our 
current idealized definition and what a “final definition” might be.  As In the case 
of units the only current constraint on a “final definition” is that it preserve current 
successes. But in the case of dimensional quantities, creatures of fundamental 
theories, the success of a fundamental theory is entirely entangled with the work 
done by other theories, fundamental and non-fundamental. What would it mean 
to say that this success delimits some kind of “interval”, or other collection of 
cases reflecting facts about nature? 
 
 
3. How to understand measurement accuracy 
 
 3.1 What to make of all these considerations. For a variety of reasons, 
in any instance of measurement there is no completely specific value that is 
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determined by the total situation that fixes the objective (though unknown) 
accuracy, in the sense of difference between the actual value and the value that 
is the measurement outcome.  We have considered and found wanting an effort 
to substitute some kind of interval or other collection of values for an objective 
value. Yet, there is no denying that in any actual case of measurement  there is a 
range of values that are, as a matter of objective fact, reasonable ones that could 
be used, and comparison with any of which gives a measure of accuracy. Note 
the shift, in the last sentence, to the epistemic notion of reasonably assigned 
values.  These are still objective, in as much as there is a right and a wrong, or at 
least a more or less reasonable, that constrain what we should do and which 
indirectly reflect what is going on in a world too complicated for us to know 
exactly. 
 
 For a sensible idea of how this works, we should look at how metrologists 
evaluate accuracy.14 
 
 3.2: How metrologists evaluate accuracy: Robustness accuracy. As I 
have been at pains to emphasize, our understanding of quantities and how they 
might be measured is hostage to our currently best theories.  Time is 
characterized by GTR, temperature by thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics, and so on.  Also central are theories that describe the interrelation of 
the quantity in question with other quantities.  Where time is measured by 
periodic motion, crucial are theories of the motions in question.  The current 
definition of the second appeals to a spectral emission of cesium, the theory of 
which calls on quantum field theory.  Temperature is measured by the 
temperature dependence of other quantities such as volumes of gasses and 
liquids, the electrical properties of substances, and again spectral properties of 
electromagnetic emissions for heated substances.  Designing and evaluating 
measuring instruments for temperature requires applying the theories of these 
substances and the relation of temperature to their other properties.   
 
 Let’s look in a little more detail at how this plays out in the case of 
determination of units.  A unit, such as the second or the kilogram, is given a 
theoretical or physical “definition”.  The theoretical characterizations require 
various idealizations, such as 0ºK and a zero gravitational potential.  The 
physical prototype for the kilogram functions as a fixed standard only under 
idealizations such as no scratches when handled and no absorption of impurities. 
The theoretical characterizations then must be physically realized. While the 
prototype for the kilogram is already physically realized, the same problems that 
arise for physical realization of theoretically defined units arise for a physically 
defined unit with the need to make copies. The physical realizations or copying 
depart from the idealized theoretical definitions and ideal circumstances 
assumed for a physical standard.  To make effective use of a standard one must, 
                                            
14 In what follows I am closely following Tal (2011) and (2012  chapter 4). 
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in physically realizing or copying, insofar as possible, minimize these departures 
from the idealized definitions and conditions; and one further appeals to any 
relevant theory for help in further correcting for departures from the idealizations 
insofar as these departures still affect the physical realizations and copies.  As 
we have seen, such deidealization cannot be done in any perfectly exact way, 
and what we come up with is hostage to the theories we use.  Still, these theories 
are the best account of nature that we have, and we use them as best we can.   
 
 Metrologists work to keep track of such departures from the idealizations 
with what they call “uncertainty budgeting” that appeals to theory to estimate the 
uncertainties that arise as a result of failure to completely deidealize.15  To be 
sure, these departures are not from something exactly fixed in nature but from 
standards that are as characterized by theories that are themselves idealized. 
That is, it is understood that these uncertainty estimates are relative to the 
theories used and thus limited by the shortcomings of these theories.  In 
consistency with all of the worries of section 2, these are not estimated 
departures from something fixed in nature but from the ideal depicted by what we 
take to be our best theories. 
 
 It is these estimated uncertainties, deployed in a robustness condition, 
that then provide the basis for attributing a level of accuracy to a measurement 
standard. In Tal’s account of the special case of the standard second one uses  
 
two interlocking lines of inquiry: on the one hand metrologists work to 
increase the level of detail with which they model clocks.  On the other 
hand, clocks are continually compared to each other in light of their 
most recent theoretical and statistical models. The uncertainty budget 
associated with a standard is then considered sufficiently detailed if 
and only if these two lines of inquiry yield consistent results.  The 
upshot of this method is that the uncertainty ascribed to a standard 
clock is deemed adequate if and only if the outcomes of that clock 
converge to those of other clocks within the uncertainties ascribed to 
each clock by appropriate models, where appropriateness is 
determined by the best currently available theoretical knowledge and 
data-analysis methods.  (Tal (2011), p. 1091) 
 
 We have essentially the same story for the accuracy of measuring 
instruments proper.  One provides a theoretical model for an instrument, relying 
on theory to minimize, insofar as possible, the uncertainties in the sense given 
above.  Insofar as practicable, such models will take into consideration all the 
factors that, according to current theory, might affect the measurement process.  
One then uses these models to estimate the residual uncertainties, the 
inaccuracies to which the instrument might still be subject, once again according 
to our best theories.  All the estimated uncertainties are combined, and combined 
                                            
15 I follow Tal (2011) especially pp. 1090-1093 
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with the over all uncertainty in the unit standard used in the calibration of the 
instrument.  
 
 The estimated uncertainties, deployed in a robustness condition, then 
provide the basis for attributing a level of accuracy to an instrument.  Tal’s 
summary is: 
 
Given multiple, sufficiently diverse processes that are used to measure 
the same quantity, the uncertainties ascribed to their outcomes are 
adequate if and only if  
  
 (i) discrepancies among measurement outcomes fall within their 
ascribed uncertainties; and  
 
 (ii) the ascribed uncertainties are derived from appropriate [as 
described above] models of each measurement process.  (Tal 
2012, p. 175) 
 
Uncertainties that satisfy this robustness condition qualify as reliable measures of 
the accuracies of the measurement outcomes of the instruments in question. 
 
 3.3  But why should such uncertainties count as measures of 
accuracy? One may take the robustness condition to proceed in the following 
spirit.16  The world is too complicated for us to be able to describe it exactly as it 
is.  We have to rely on a network of (not always exactly consistent) idealized 
theoretical accounts.  But we use these accounts precisely because they give us 
a good enough picture to get along for a wide range of objectives.  The 
uncertainties that figure in the robustness condition are not interpreted as 
uncertainties of departure from the realists’ actually occurring values17 but as 
departures from values that we can suppose would occur in the idealized 
circumstances described by our theories.  Broadly, our composite idealized 
accounts are good enough to be highly reliable, and it is just a special case of 
this over all reliability that we won’t get into trouble by treating departures from 
supposed idealized values of idealized quantities characterized in idealized units 
as departures from postulated actually occurring values of real quantities 
described in exactly characterized units. In the larger idealized picture of the 
subject matter the measurement outcome is off by some (not exactly known) 
                                            
16 Tal appears to have a different attitude towards his robustness condition.  He 
never considers possible failure of the presupposition of what I am calling 
traditional measurement accuracy realism.  See his (2011 p. 1094). 
 
17 Although they might also be that.  Remember that this paper does not argue 
that there are no potential referents in nature but that, should there be such, our 
terms fail to attach to them.   
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definite value from WHAT IT WOULD BE IN THE (OR SOME) SIMPLIFIED 
WORLD  characterized by our idealized larger picture.18 
 
 Accuracy realism fails because of reference failure, and reference fails 
because of, a fact that we too easily let drop out of view, the ubiquitous 
idealizations of our theoretical accounts of the world.  We forget the idealized 
status of our theories precisely because they work so well and so broadly.  
Generally speaking, we get on successfully treating the world as characterized 
by the idealized dimensional quantities, specified in idealized units, and then 
applied more specifically with the idealized concrete versions provided by 
working quantities.  In short, we proceed AS IF the presupposition of traditional 
measurement accuracy realism were true.  In other words, the presupposition of 
accuracy realism is itself an additional idealization, or perhaps a collective 
application of prior idealizations.   
 
 Measurement standards function for us as the bench marks against which 
measurement accuracy is evaluated.  But that comes down to saying that we 
treat objects as having values for quantities as characterized in terms of our 
current measurement standards.  On the one hand, we know that these 
standards are always susceptible to improvement, in ways in part marked by the 
ascribed uncertainties.  But at any moment we can do no better than to treat the 
world as characterized in terms of these standards, that is, as if the world were 
just as so characterized. Acknowledging that improvement is always an option 
comes to acknowledging that using a standard as our guide to the world is an 
idealization.  
 
 The robustness condition is essential to the success of so proceeding. 
The condition functions as a prescription to check, check with great 
thoroughness, that the various ways in which we assign values to quantities as 
described in our theories all fit together well enough not to engender difficulties.19 
The robustness condition functions precisely to insure that taking the 
presupposition of accuracy realism, made concrete in terms of our measurement 
standards, as an additional idealization or collective application of antecedent 
idealizations, does not spoil the larger operation of the sketch of the world 
                                            
18 Remember that I am using ‘idealization’ very broadly to characterize any 
representation that stands to be improved by being made more accurate in some 
way where “improved” may be understood as relative to some descriptively more 
successful representation. See note 10. 
 
19 Note that this way of thinking of the robustness condition differs from thinking 
of it as a regulative ideal of bringing language and reality into perfect alignment. I 
don’t think that these attitudes exclude one another.  It would be a very useful 
way to further explore these issues to consider the pros and cons of both these 
attitudes.   
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provided by concrete application of our interconnected idealized models and 
theories.  
 
 The current proposal is not to scrap the concept of traditional accuracy 
realism in favor of some substantially different concept.  Rather I am urging a 
change in how we think about the concept. We apply the familiar concept but no 
longer in a traditional realist spirit. Instead we appreciate its status as an 
idealization. Consider some specific measurement situation with an object of 
measurement being evaluated for the value of some quantity as characterized by 
our relevant current theories.  Satisfaction of the robustness condition insures 
that if one were to use any realization of the available measurement standards 
for this quantity one would get the same value up to the tolerances characterized 
by the uncertainty budgeting. Given this reliable consistency one won’t get into 
trouble by idealizing, by thinking of the situation as one in which there IS a 
quantity characterized by our theories, a unit set by the measurement standards, 
and that the object has a value for that quantity in those units. This last is just to 
say in the material mode exactly what is reexpressed in the formal mode by 
saying that the expression 
 
There is a quantity characterized by our theories, a unit set by the 
measurement standards, and that the object has a value for that 
quantity in those units 
 
has precise referents, the quantity, the units and the value in question.  We know 
that these expressions do not have referents, but there is much practical 
advantage and no harm is done by treating them as if they did. 
 
 As for the accuracy of some instrument that is not part of the system of 
measurement standards, we think of it, within the scope of the idealization, as the 
difference between the measurement result and the supposed actual value.  Of 
course even if the world were as in the idealization, the best we could do to get 
that supposed value would be the values of one or another measurement 
standard, qualified by the uncertainty budget.  But since in the real world the very 
best we could presently do would be exactly those results of one or another 
measurement standard, in practice what we can have is exactly what we would 
have if the world were as in the idealization.  With the robustness condition in 
place the idealization can’t get us into trouble.     
 
 
  4. Quantities and units understood as vague. Some readers will 
have been thinking throughout:  The problems here are all problems having to do 
with vagueness.  So there is no special problem here, nothing problematic over 
and above whatever general problems there may be with vagueness.  
 
 I agree, at least for the case of working quantities and units.  The 
proposal, however does not work for the case of dimensional quantities.  In this 
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section I will examine the connection and argue that treatment in terms of 
vagueness and in terms of idealization as in the last section are really two 
different ways of getting at the same thing. Certain advantages accruing to 
working with idealization, starting with the circumstance that framing in terms of 
idealization gives a uniform treatment of dimensional quantities along with units 
and working quantities, also thereby providing a kind of generalization of the 
notion of vagueness.  
 
 On its face, ‘accurate’ is vague in exactly the way that ‘flat’ is vague – 
‘accurate’ is not the target there.  Rather it is the expressions that have the form 




 The temperature of the water in this glass 
 
 The time at which John arrived home. 
 
There is no one temperature that counts as the temperature of the water in this 
glass.  If you think that temperature is an intrinsic quality of objects no one 
number will do – any real body of water in a glass will have some temperature 
gradients.  Perhaps you want to take a statistical mechanical definition of 
temperature, the mean kinetic energy of all the molecules in the glass – but this 
too will suffer fluctuations and is, in any case, a classical idealization.  Likewise 
there is no one precise moment that counts as the moment at which John arrived 
home.  When he pulled his car into the driveway (and just which moment was 
that)? When he stepped over the threshold? When he hung his hat on the hat 
rack…? ‘The time at which John arrived home’ is vague, and in an analogous  
way so is ‘The temperature of the water in this glass’. 
 
 Note that this proposal importantly differs from the interval proposal 
considered in section 2.6: There is no determinate interval of values that could 
count as the time of John’s arrival; and likewise no determinate interval of values 
that could count as the water’s temperature.  Below we will consider how to make 
sense of a contrasting “indeterminate” collection of values. 
 
 If working quantity terms are vague, then there appears to be a simple 
way to characterize ‘accurate’. Let’s call the imprecisely characterized collection 
of values that would work for the temperature of the water in this glass the 
“temperature value collection”.  We could then characterize  
 
Accurate (enough): Close enough for present purposes to any one (or 




Problem solved! On this analysis, ‘accurate’ comes out as doubly vague: vague 
in the “enough” (compare:  flat (enough) ), but also vague in the “the values in the 
in the temperature value collection”.  
 
 We understand this approach precisely as well as we understand 
“temperature value collection.” Again, section 2.6 rejected the option of saying 
that, though imprecisely characterized, there must BE some determinate interval 
or other collection of values that is in question.  We need to develop some 
alternative way of thinking about what is going on when we talk about such 
intervals or collections 
 
 Let’s work this though for “the time at which John arrived home”.  Suppose 
that we check the security camera and find that John turned off his car at 
4:59:32, crossed the threshold at 5:00:02 and his hat hit the hook on the hat rack 
at 5:00:05.  For virtually any practical purpose that might come up you could use 
any of these times for “the time at which John arrived home”, as well as many 
others that are, from a practical point of view “close enough”, though 5:00:00 
would be the obvious practical choice.  Which numbers could be used is open 
ended in the sense that which ones would be appropriate choices depends on 
what is at issue, in turn fixed by the context, but “the context” itself will shift from 
case to case and in no case will be specific in every respect. At the margins one 
is free to cut the edges as one likes, and when the margins are fine enough 
choices will be arbitrary. 
 
 There is no determinate collection of values that qualify.  There are only 
the practical questions of what numbers will serve, and how well, for practical 
issues.  
 
 Yes: the approach illustrated in this example supplies an approach that 
could be applied very generally to the phenomenon of vagueness.  Tal’s 
robustness analysis is attractive because it provides a basis for making out this 
kind of thinking in an exceptionally general and coherent way for the case of 
measurement accuracy. 
 
 I do not know of any explicit development of this approach to vagueness in 
the vast vagueness literature.  The usual way of dealing with the worry of 
indeterminately specified collections is the hierarchy of higher order borderline 
cases. Such developments may provide interesting formal constructions, but they 
are terrible models of vagueness of terms in natural languages and in particular 
in the languages of science.  A borderline case is a case in which one is 
appropriately unsure about what to say.  A borderline-borderline case would be 
one in which one is appropriately not sure whether one is appropriately unsure 
about what to say – something that in some cases we can make sense of, but 
something that in practice arises extremely rarely, if ever. The third order case 
goes beyond any normal human capacity or need, and so beyond anything that 
corresponds to the function of human language.  The pragmatic approach to 
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vagueness fits these conditions perfectly. 
 
 Understanding vagueness as a practical question of applicability makes it 
easy to see the connection with idealization. In the case of the temperature of the 
water in this glass, given practical and theoretical questions of applicability that 
might come up we have some latitude as to which number to use for the 
temperature.  Choice of any one is an idealized description of a much more 
messy real world situation. An idealization is, strictly speaking, false. But within 
its domain of applicability one can use it as if the world were just as the 
idealization says it is.  That is, for a suitable range of practical or theoretical 
questions the idealization functions as a precisification of a corresponding 
imprecisely characterized situation.  In the case of the temperature of the water 
in our glass, postulating a precise value for the temperature is a precisification of 
the imprecisely characterized temperature value collection, one that is 
appropriate just when it is one of the values that arise in the practical analysis of 
the kind we have seen above.  I call precisely stated idealizations and 
corresponding imprecise, or vague, characterizations “semantic alter egos” 
because they are different ways of accomplishing the same semantic work. 20 21 
 
 But working with idealizations has the advantage that it will apply in the 
treatment of dimensional quantities where, I will now argue, thinking in terms of 
vagueness no longer applies. 
 
 To understand a vague term requires understanding how to make it more 
precise.  This we can easily do for working quantities. For units I could make a 
case either way, depending on how we make more precise the vague 
“understanding how to make it more precise”. But dimensional quantities can’t be 
forced into this mold for the kinds of reasons that already came up when we 
discussed the precise interval option for dimensional quantities. What would 
count as precisifications for terms for dimensional quantities would be de-
idealizations.  But for our currently most detailed theoretical account of a 
dimensional quantity we have no idea how to de-idealize – if we did we would 
already have these proposed theories on the table! 
 
 To make this out in more detail requires addressing a complication.  If the 
issue is put, not in terms of an attribute of theory, idealization, but instead an 
attribute of language, vagueness, we have also to bring in the phenomenon of 
ambiguity because many of the relevant idealizations in question will correspond 
to ambiguity rather than vagueness.  Vagueness – susceptibility to precisification 
from an indefinite range of refinements – and ambiguity – susceptibility to 
                                            
20 See my (2011 and forthcoming) for much more detail. 
 
21 Once the connection between idealization and vagueness is made, section 2 
functions as an extended argument against epistemic accounts of vagueness. 
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disambiguation from a determinate, very limited collection of determinate 
meanings – are not the same phenomenon.22 For many theoretical 
considerations about language they must be distinguished.  But for our purposes 
we can lump them together. The two share the relevant feature that to 
understand a vague/ambiguous term in a way that involves awareness of the 
vagueness/ambiguity requires knowing how to make the term more 
precise/knowing how to disambiguate the term.  While not absolutely clear, it is at 
least odd and/or misleading to say that a term, as used in a language community,  
is vague or ambiguous even though no one in the community has any awareness 
of that vagueness or ambiguity or any understanding of how to precisify or 
disambiguate the term. 
 
 The kind of problem we are considering for dimensional quantities turns 
on variation in the discrete parameter, theory.  Consider, for example, mass.  As 
the term is now used it is ambiguous, between rest mass and relativistic mass. 
But this is only post 1905!  I submit that as used before 1905 the term ‘mass’ was 
not ambiguous – it referred to Newtonian mass, now best understood as rest 
mass. Before 1905 no one knew of the relativistic alternative so disambiguation 
was not an option.23 
 
 The case for dimensional quantities differs from that of units and working 
quantities in two ways.  First, it is ambiguity, not vagueness that is in question.  
From the perspective of our present interests this is an irrelevant difference.  But 
second, when it comes to the dimensional quantities as characterized in our 
currently most detailed theory, the terms for dimensional quantities do not count 
as ambiguous.  As noted above, if we could disambiguate this would be by 
appeal to more detailed theory that, in the cases in question, we do not have.   
 
 But the cases in which we can precicify/disambgiguate and those in which 
we can’t still have in common the underlying source – idealization.  We can 
appreciate that our characterization involves idealization.  But we may or may not 
know how, at least to some extent, to de-idealize.  When we do know, we have 
vagueness or ambiguity; when we do not know we don’t.  This is the reason for 
which our present subject is more perspicuously approached in terms of 
                                            
22 See  Bromberger (2012, pp. 75-8 and passim.) 
 
23 A slightly more careful version of this account:  Prerelativistically, ‘mass’ was 
ambiguous between inertial mass, gravitational mass, and the pretheoretic 
quantity of matter.  Newtonian inertial mass was non-relational, and in special 
relativity it is replaced by relativistic inertial mass that is relative to an inertial 
frame.  This makes inertial mass, post 1905, ambiguous in a way similar to the 
ambiguity in ‘heaviness’, ambiguous between the relational quantity, weight, and 
the non-relational quantity, mass, a dimension of relationality that layers on the 
foregoing. I differ from van Fraassen (2002, pp. 115-6) who at least suggests that 
‘inertial mass’ was somehow tacitly ambiguous before 1905.   
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idealization rather than vagueness and ambiguity.   
 
 5. Concluding Thoughts.  I have argued for the systematic failure of 
reference for referring terms for quantities and their values.  We have seen this 
failure as a kind of generalized kind of vagueness (and ambiguity).  Since 
vagueness is a ubiquitous aspect of language, in and out of science, this 
suggests that reference failure is likewise a very general feature of language.  
Braun and Sider claim just this, taking this circumstance to be sufficiently obvious 
that no argument is required: 
 
[T]he facts that determine meaning (for instance, facts about use, 
naturalness of properties, and causal relations between speakers and 
properties) do not determine a unique property to be the meaning of 
‘red’ [and likewise for expressions very broadly] (134) 
 
We can see section 2 as showing in detail that this is so in the special case of 
terms for quantities, their units, and their values. 
 
 Just as section 2’s problem of reference failure – aka generalized 
vagueness/ambiguity – generalizes to all human representation, I urge that the 
response in section 3 likewise generalizes: It is through idealizations that we 
know the world.  The world is too complex for us to have representations that 
characterize it exactly, that is with both perfect precision and perfect accuracy.  
Our representations always fall at least somewhat short in one or both of these 
two ways. This is as true of perceptual as of theoretical knowledge. But we do 
know a great deal. Knowing the world is knowing the world through idealizations, 
and insofar imperfectly.    
 
 It is a fair question, what is it to know the world through idealizations?  
This is a question on which I have touched in many other articles24 but which 
needs much more thought and discussion. Indeed, it requires a wholesale 
overhaul of our understanding of human knowledge.  For the moment I will leave 
it with the suggestion that the present treatment of measurement accuracy and 
its appeal to Tal’s robustness condition provides an exemplar that can usefully 
guide our thinking.   
 
 The problem I have discussed in section 2 is the semantic problem of 
reference failure, not an epistemic problem of difficulty in knowing values that are 
alleged to have been fixed.  But the suggestion of this section is that ubiquitous 
reference failure gives rise to a very different epistemic limitation, that we know 
the world only through idealizations. Philosophical tradition to the contrary not 
withstanding, knowing imperfectly is still knowing what the world is like, in 
particular, that it is very like one occupied by such and such idealized objects 
with such and such idealized characteristics. One doesn’t have to get it exactly 
                                            
24  See my 2004, 2009a, 2009b, 2001, and forthcoming. 
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right about what things there are and their properties. There is a difference 
between getting things wrong in ways or to an extent that do not presently matter 
and getting things badly or completely wrong. Complete precision and accuracy 
is not humanly attainable and also not needed.  Imperfect knowledge is still 
knowledge of the world, we can add redundantly, of the way the world is 
REALLY. This isn’t traditional realism, but it is the sensible way in which we 
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